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The Arab world amidst the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 
 
Shalendra D. Sharma 
Department of Politics, University of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, USA 
 
Abstract 
When the problems in the United States housing sector mushroomed into a global financial crisis by September 
2008, it was assumed that Arab countries would remain immune: the oil‐rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries because of their massive financial reserves, and the resource‐poor countries because of their limited 
linkages to the global economic system – in particular, the global financial markets. However, this assumption 
has proven to be false. The US subprime mortgage collapse not only pushed the advanced economies into 
recession, but also it shattered global economic confidence, resulting in a massive financial contagion around 
the world. What explains the Arab World's vulnerability to the crisis? How has the crisis impacted both the 
resource rich and the resource poor? How have Arab countries responded to the crisis, and what must they do 








When the subprime‐induced financial crisis broke out in the United States (the country with the 
world's most sophisticated financial system) in mid‐2007, it was widely believed that the economic 
fallout would be mainly limited to the United States and that American authorities would eventually 
contain the crisis. After all, the US economic slowdown was related to factors specific to the US 
economy, especially problems associated with expansionary monetary policy that had kept US 
interest rates low for some years and led to a real estate (property) bubble, rather than to more 
systemic factors such as an oil shock or adverse trade relations (Cohan 2008, Schwartz 2009, Taylor 
2009). Even as some analysts predicted a contagion spreading to other economies and regions, there 
was broad consensus that the Arab World – an economically diverse region that includes both the 
oil‐rich economies in the Gulf and the resource‐poor (in relation to the population), such as Egypt, 
Morocco, Syria and Yemen – would either escape or successfully weather the worst of the crisis. 1 
 
The reasons for the Arab countries' supposed immunity to the crisis varied. The prosperous oil‐rich 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states who together control 45% of the world's oil reserves and 
18% of the natural gas reserves and are awash with cash from skyrocketing oil prices invested in 
their well‐endowed ‘sovereign wealth funds’ (SWFs) seemed well‐sheltered, if not invulnerable, to 
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the fast‐spreading subprime‐induced crisis. 2 In fact, SWFs such as the Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA) and the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) were widely believed to have the capacity 
continually to boost liquidity and confidence in both the domestic and the regional economy. 3 
Indeed, the GCC countries were seen as possible shock absorbers and ‘stabilizers’ – their 
exceptionally strong economic positions serving as both a potential cushion against the global 
downturn and the engine pulling cash‐starved economies from recession by providing the 
desperately needed liquidity and supporting global demand. On the other hand, for hydrocarbon‐
poor countries, their economic backwardness and relative isolation from the global financial and 
capital markets (minus the oil industry, the Arab World accounts for only 2.5% of world economic 
growth) was seen as their saving grace – a shield against the vagaries of global financial turmoil. 
However, as shown in Table 1, both these predictions have proven to be false. Real gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth has declined across the region. 
 
The current crisis has unambiguously and painfully underscored that in today's globalized and 
interconnected world no nation is an island. The ferocious contagion or the ‘exogenous shocks’ from 
the advanced economies has put the world economy in its most serious crisis since the 1930s 
(Krugman 2009, Posner 2009). In the Arab countries, after an initial period of calm and seeming 
resilience, the economic turbulence reached both the oil‐rich and oil‐poor economies – albeit the 
forces behind the contagion and the impact have been varied and uneven across the region. Despite 
the adoption of highly expansionary policies (with the central banks in the region providing 
stimulus packages and liquidity, besides lowering reserve requirements and interest rates) in Egypt, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Arab countries to mitigate the adverse economic 
shocks, the region, nevertheless, saw economic growth contract from 6% in 2008 to 2.5% in 2009. In 
fact, the slowdown is broadly similar in oil‐producing and non‐oil‐producing countries – albeit their 
socio‐economic impact is varied. 
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For example, in the ever‐resilient Kuwait, in keeping with global trends, the country's stock 
exchange index fell by 50% in October 2008. However, news that a Kuwaiti bank had suffered 
significant losses in late 2008 from trading in currency derivatives further spooked the markets and 
saw the third largest bank lose US$1.4 billion – forcing the authorities to guarantee customer 
deposits at local banks. In December 2008, Kuwait's largest investment company defaulted on most 
of its US$3 billion debt obligations and has been forced to negotiate a debt restructuring. However, 
the impact on the real economy has been modest as Kuwait (like other oil‐rich countries) has a 
comfortable financial cushion to mitigate the impact. On the other hand, the impact on resource‐
poor countries has been more severe. Since the GCC is a key source of investment financing (through 
foreign direct investment [FDI] and other flows) as well as remittances for these economies, the 
abrupt decline in income and investment flows has contributed to the overall decline in growth. No 
doubt, it has made the lives of about 23% of the 300 million people in the Middle East and North 
Africa who draw subsistence on less than US$2 a day much more difficult (The World Bank 2008). 
 
What explains why the current crisis which originated in the US market for subprime mortgages 
has spread so quickly and virulently to other credit markets and economies with limited or no 
exposure to these toxic assets? What are the ‘transmission channels’ or how specifically has the crisis 
spread to the Arab countries? How have the Arab countries been impacted by the crisis and what 
are the short‐ and potential long‐term economic implications? How have governments and regional 
bodies responded to the challenges posed by the unprecedented crisis in their midst? How can the 
Arab countries, especially the poorest, better insulate their economies from the vagaries of the global 
financial markets? This paper addresses these issues with reference to selected Arab countries: 
Egypt, Yemen and the UAE. 4 
 
Broad transmission channels 
 
The adage that in this era of globalization no country is an island is apt. The volume of international 
capital flows has surged from just under US$2 trillion in 2000 to US$6.4 trillion in 2006. These funds 
now cross national borders, often at will, despite attempts by governments to control and regulate 
their movement. Deep financial integration also means more rapid and powerful spillover across 
economies through both traditional trade and more new types of financial channels. 5 As Table 2 
shows, Arab countries are quite open in terms of trade – the trade openness index of thirteen Arab 
countries averaged around 71.3%. Of course, oil‐exporting countries register the highest indices 
reflecting the weight of oil and gas in their exports, as well as the importance of imports in their 
economies. 6 Although spillovers through the trade channel remains a central transmission 
mechanism (even though global trade patterns have become more diversified), financial spillovers 
have become more pronounced as the rising correlation of global equity prices and the potential for 
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sudden capital flow reversals mean that shocks at the core can be transmitted rapidly throughout 
the entire global financial system (Allen and Douglas 2009). 
 
Significant withdrawals from emerging economies, including the GCC equity and debt funds, 
confirm that investors in the advanced economies began to retract from emerging economies around 
October 2008. Leading the charge were cash‐strapped US financial institutions that began en‐mass 
to ‘deleverage’ or sell their assets to raise cash to strengthen their balance sheets back home. In turn, 
this led to sharp drops in stock prices around the world (in the GCC this was most evident in a 
widening of sovereign risk spreads and a sharp downturn in stock markets – especially for real 
estate companies), the relative increases in the value of the US dollar against all currencies, a reversal 
in capital flows, a shortage of liquid foreign reserves, and tighter restrictions on credit availability. 
In the GCC this was made worse by expectations of an appreciation of the dirham vis‐à‐vis the dollar. 
Further, as investors began to flee global markets for the safe haven of US Treasuries (not only 
because of risk aversion, but also due their need to sell assets to raise cash to cover debts), stock 
markets around the world plunged and many currencies depreciated – some overnight. 
 
Exacerbating the problem was the proliferation of new hybrid products such as derivatives, 
sovereign credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and new forms of mortgage‐backed 
securities. Coupled with creative accounting practices that often overlooked risk and prudent 
corporate governance it has meant that economies that earlier had been relatively sheltered could 
be suddenly hit – especially if there were concerns regarding equity and currency mismatches. This 
partly explains the rapidity by which equity and bond prices plummeted, sovereign and corporate 
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spreads increased, and inter‐bank spreads rose. Beyond these conduits, global shifts in market 
sentiment or ‘risk aversion’ which often manifest themselves through low public confidence and 
herd behaviour in markets have been particularly pronounced in this crisis. The sharp deterioration 
in household wealth in the advanced economies and concern about the overall soundness of the US 
economy and the exposure of hitherto unknown domestic structural vulnerabilities have resulted in 
a heightened sense of vulnerability and a rise in risk aversion. This has only led to further reduction 
in household consumption and precautionary saving. 
 
Specific transmission channels: the cases of Egypt and Yemen 
 
Between 2007 and mid‐2008, the Egyptian economy had been growing at an unprecedented rate of 
about 7%. The unemployment rate was down from 11% to 8%, and the seemingly entrenched 
poverty levels were finally on the decline. The country's financial sector, especially banks and 
investment companies, were not large holders of subprime mortgage‐backed securities – the so‐
called ‘toxic assets’ – and banking sector reforms, especially in the area of bank supervision and 
consolidation of non‐performing loans (NPLs), had made the banking sector more resilient. Just as 
important, Egypt's net international reserves stood at a robust US$35 billion in October 2008 
(International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2009a). Yet, these robust fundamentals have hardly made the 
Egyptian economy immune to the contagion emanating from the advanced economies. In large part 
this is because the resource poor or the non‐oil exporting Arab countries such as Egypt already 
facing significant economic pressures and heavily depended on external assistance (in the form of 
aid, FDI, and through worker remittances) were from the outset extremely susceptible to exogenous 
economic shocks. In fact, countries such as Egypt and Yemen, but also Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and 
Lebanon, depend much on exports, tourism, remittance receipts from workers abroad (largely from 
Europe and the GCC countries), and more recently through FDI flows. In most of these countries 
the revenue generated accounts for a substantial proportion of their GDP. A decline of these 
revenues both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP has had negative consequences for growth 
and development. 
 
The Egyptian economy has been impacted via a number of broad transmission channels discussed 
above such as global deleveraging and a drop in export revenues, as well as country‐specific ones 
such as contraction in the tourism industry and sharp reductions in Suez Canal tolls and remittances 
from expatriate workers. The sharp decline in export volumes to the Euro Area, East Asia and the 
United States has hit Egypt hard. Similarly, tourism, which is the country's major foreign exchange 
earner (bringing in some US$11 billion dollars in 2007), and contributing 8.5% of Egypt's GDP, has 
experienced a significant decline since mid‐2008. According to the Egyptian Ministry of Economic 
Development, ‘each tourist dollar spent ultimately generates US$4 or US$5 in income’ – showing a 
strong correlation between incomes and tourism (Mohieldin 2008). Similarly, in the fiscal year 2007–
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2008 (end of June 2008), remittances from Egyptian expatriate workers (the vast majority work in 
the oil‐rich Gulf countries) sent about US$8.56 billion to the home country. 7 However, the economic 
crisis has forced a major retrenchment with massive layoffs of emigrant workers. In fact, thousands 
of workers from Egypt, Yemen, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (among other countries) have 
already returned ‘home’ from the Gulf – adding to the ranks of the unemployed. Exacerbating 
Egypt's woes has been the loss of revenue from the Suez Canal. Despite concerns about pirates off 
the Somali coast, the waterway earned a record US$5.2 billion in 2007. However, the shrinkage in 
global trade and the resultant drop in the numbers of ships using the canal have led to a sharp drop 
in toll revenue – which stood at US$301.8 million in February 2009 – a 25% decline compared with 
the US$408 million in January 2008. Moreover, plunging exports of manufactured goods to the 
United States and the European Union, and food exports to the European Union and the Arab World 
have exacerbated the problem of falling revenues and growing unemployment. Overall, the 
country's real GDP growth fell by 2 percentage points in 2008/2009 and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) projects a further decline to about 4.5–5.0% in 2009–2010 (IMF 2009a). In mid‐2008, Egypt 
experienced an abrupt reversal of portfolio flows as foreign investors pulled out of the equity and 
government bond markets. The central bank responded by running down its foreign currency 
deposits with commercial banks. The sharp decline in external liquidity has raised the cost of debt 
servicing and put pressure on the current account balance (IMF 2009c). 
 
Countries lacking in oil wealth now face weaker prospects for exports, FDI, tourism, and remittances 
as the worldwide recession has deepened. The case of Yemen is illustrative. Yemen is one of the 
poorest countries in the Arab World. Its economy has been stagnating with an estimated 35% of its 
population living below the poverty line. As the Middle East and North Africa is the world's largest 
net food‐importing region, Yemen, like a large number of countries in the region, suffered heavily 
from the food and fuel crisis which preceded the onset of the global financial crisis. With food (and 
oil) prices skyrocketing to record levels over 2006 to mid‐2008, the terms of trade for food and oil‐
importing countries, including Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt, among others, 
plummeted – with rising inflation (around 17% in Yemen) having an adverse effect on the poor (IMF 
2008b). Yet, when the financial crisis broke and food and oil prices sharply declined, it provided 
some relief to countries reeling under its inflationary impact. Furthermore, Yemen's isolation from 
the global economy was seen as a blessing. Like most resource‐poor Arab countries, Yemen is 
insulated from global financial markets. Yemeni banks have low exposure to private foreign lending 
and portfolio investment is almost non‐existent given the absence of a domestic stock market or 
commercial credit market (IMF 2009e). Yet, Yemen is highly vulnerable to commodity shocks as it is 
an importer of food and inputs, and depends heavily on remittances from workers in the Gulf, and 
FDI in the form of official aid. In fact, the case of Yemen confirms the empirical evidence that aid is 
procyclical with donor incomes. Moreover, domestic financial institutions have limited deposits and 
liquidity. Therefore, unlike its resource‐rich neighbours, Yemen does not have the wherewithal to 
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meet revenue shortfalls. This means that Yemen has been unable to put in place a vigorous fiscal 
stimulus to respond to the economic downturn. As a result, the crisis has hit Yemen particularly 
hard. Already the loss of revenue from returning workers has placed great pressures on government 
expenditures, as have declines in donor assistance and tighter external financing conditions. This 
has translated into ballooning fiscal deficits, pressures on the balance of payments and overall 
worsening of the country's budgetary position. If unemployment and poverty levels continue to 
increase, it could have adverse implications for social and political stability. 
 
Specific transmission channels: the UAE 
 
The experience of the UAE, at least of some of the federation's member states, underscores the fact 
that wealth is not necessarily a protection against financial crises. Rather, misallocation of resources 
can make even wealthy states extremely vulnerable to a fast‐moving financial crisis. However, when 
the crisis began, the UAE was assumed to be well insulated from the global financial turbulence 
despite the fact that its economy is among the most globally integrated in the world. 8 In fact, the 
UAE is an important participant in global capital markets through several ‘blue‐chip’ investment 
institutions, including the Abu Dhabi Investment Council, the Dubai Ports and Free Zone World, 
Dubai Holding and the Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC). In addition, 
the Dubai Financial Market, Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange, Nasdaq Dubai and the Saudi Stock 
Exchange are an integral part of global financial markets. Moreover, the UAE's banking sector awash 
with ‘windfall’ liquidity from record oil prices was seen as being healthy. In fact, the UAE's banking 
system were not only well capitalized, but also highly profitable as the ‘banks' assets and profits 
increased sharply in 2007 and the capital adequacy ratio stood at 13.3 percent by mid‐2008, above 
the regulatory minimum of 10 percent’ (IMF 2009b). 9 In fact, one of the unintended outcomes of the 
punitive investment restrictions imposed by the United States (especially on Middle East nations) 
after September 2001 forced the GCC to diversify its massive foreign exchange surpluses regionally. 
That is, instead of investing the bulk of its revenues in US Treasury bills or in eurodollar accounts 
at multinational banks, the GCC government's began aggressively to build up their SWFs, including 
investments in a variety of domestic state‐controlled institutions (Table 3). The UAE, which began 
devoting a significant portion of its oil revenues in the SWFs was able to build up a colossal ‘war 
chest’ worth more than US$875 billion by May 2007. This massive accumulated wealth (at least 
relative to its GDP) was seen as a bulwark that could be used to mitigate the effect of oil price 
cyclicality and support continued investments to sustain growth. Finally, since the federation's 
write‐downs from subprime assets were minimal, it was seen as being immune to the crisis. 
 
Yet, in the oil‐producing countries where the export of hydrocarbons is the single most important 
determinant of economic success, the rather abrupt drop in oil prices (from US$147 per barrel in July 
2008 to US$38.60 per barrel in December 2008) was an ominous sign. Indeed, according to The World 
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Bank (2009a), ‘for the GCC in aggregate, oil and gas revenues dropped from US$670 billion in 2008 
to an estimated US$280 billion during 2009 – a massive decline equivalent to 38 percent of the 
group's GDP’ (p. 126). In the UAE, the sharp decline in the price of oil heightened concerns, namely 
that since the oil sector accounts for about 37% of the Emirate's GDP, it could now face deflation as 
the era of cheap credit was over and that the federation would not be able to generate the 
considerable fiscal surpluses to meet its ambitious, if not, profligate spending targets. 10 In addition, 
several SWFs in the Gulf region have suffered heavy losses on equity investments following the 
sharp slide in stock markets in 2008. It is believed that the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) 
has lost an estimated US$125 billion in 2008 after the credit crisis sharply cut asset prices. According 
to Setser and Ziemba (2009), the SWFs and foreign‐currency funds of the GCC have lost about 27% 
of their assets – or US$350 billion in 2008 alone. 
 
Compounding this, and to some the real threat, was the Emirates (especially Dubai's) real estate 
sector's potential exposure to global markets – in April 2008, ‘the six members of the GCC … 
announced or begun projects worth US$1.9 trillion’ (The Economist 2008). Specifically, when the 
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) free‐zone opened in 2004, it soon became the world's 
fastest‐growing financial centre boasting the presence of hundreds of banks and insurance 
companies from around the world. 11 Since foreign financial institutions did not have to pay any 
tax on profits and faced no restrictions on foreign exchange or repatriation of capital, they expanded 
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rapidly via franchising their operations throughout the region and lending to the Emirates booming 
real estate and construction sectors. However, foreign banks were not the only willing lenders. The 
UAE's banks and financial institutions in partnership with foreign subsidiaries also engaged in 
rampant speculative lending in real estate. Indeed, over the past decade, the UAE via its quasi‐
government companies (including Nakheel, Emaar and Dubai Properties) invested billions in its 
property sector in an effort to diversify its economy and reduce dependence on the oil industry. 
 
As a result, the UAE experienced a boom in property development – boasting more glittering 
skyscrapers than Manhattan – and with prices to match. The lid came off the real estate sector 
following Dubai's decision to allow foreign investors to buy property in designated areas on a 
freehold basis in 2002. The red‐hot property market literally ‘exploded’ with skyrocketing property 
values, rampant speculation, and 24‐hour construction to meet insatiable demand – not only in 
Dubai, but also in every area of the Emirates. The most ambitious, the mega‐projects, included the 
three Palm Islands and Burj Dubai – at 818 meters the world's tallest building. Yet, what was not 
fully known was the extent of the banks' (both foreign and domestic) exposure to the real estate 
market via loans to developers, namely if these loans were backed by strong collateral. Given this, 
there was palpable fear that a sharp reversal in the UAE's real estate and property market could (like 
the United States) implode with devastating effect. 
 
In October 2008, Nakheel, one of the Emirate's big three land developers (as well as companies 
directly controlled by Dubai's bullish ruler, Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid al‐Maktoum such as 
Dubai World, Investment Corporation of Dubai, and Dubai Holding), announced that it was scaling 
back dredging work on its massive Palm Deira Project – the largest of three Palm Island archipelagos 
audaciously named ‘the World’ as the island is designed as a replica of the world. Together, ‘the 
World’, an archipelago of some 300 artificial islands created just off the coast of Dubai, boasted that 
upon completion it would house more than 1 million ‘highly selective’ residents who would have 
access to state‐of‐the‐art conveniences – not only luxury complexes personally designed by no other 
than the irrepressible Donald Trump himself, but also the world's largest indoor ski slopes featuring 
fresh powder year round. 
 
The ‘unthinkable’ shocking news about Nakheel served as a wake‐up call and finally to underscore 
that Dubai's real estate bubble built on the back of borrowed cash and speculative investment was 
finally unravelling. As global deleveraging intensified, it led to a large contraction in liquidity and 
severe tightening of credit conditions, particularly in countries that were highly leveraged and 
dependent on foreign lines of credit such as Dubai. Soon this resulted in distressed sales of Dubai 
property, including the high‐end Palm Jumeirah – which saw prices plummet as investors rushed 
to offload homes and other property. Among the casualties was the exquisite tower Donald Trump 
promised would be ‘the ultimate in luxury’ and a US$100 billion beachfront resort complex. By early 
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November 2008, property prices fell by 4% in Dubai and 5% in Abu Dhabi for the first ever since 
2002. 12 But this was just the beginning. By the end of November prices had dropped by 25%. 
Sensing further losses, the large foreign banks that had been financing the UAE's and much of 
Dubai's real estate boom quickly began to pull out. The burden now fell squarely upon local banks 
and financial institutions, most of which were simply ill‐equipped to deal with the burden. Abu 
Dhabi's largest mortgage lender Amlak Finance shocked investors when it announced (in early 
November) that it was temporarily halting new home loans. A few days later the UAE's biggest 
bank, Emirates NBD, announced its decision to stop lending to foreigners who work for Dubai's 
property firms. Other banks followed suit. Worried about the health of their loan‐to‐value ratios, 
banks either refused to lend or simply lent less. By the end of 2008 the UAE's once‐booming property 
sector lay moribund – not only facing a major slowdown in loan growth and real estate activity, but 
also potential collapse. Only the UAE could now provide the desperately needed liquidity. 13 
 
Yet, with an estimated US$1.8–2.0 trillion in foreign assets (by the end of 2008), of which roughly 
60% was in dollars, it was only a matter of time before the GCC would experience asset depreciation 
(Woertz 2008, pp. 1–21). These were soon felt on the Emirates stock markets as stock and asset values 
plunged and the SWFs took their share of losses, especially funds with a high allocation in equities. 
It has been estimated: 
 
that GCC sovereign wealth funds lost 27 percent of their value in the 12 months ending December 
2008, with losses as high as 40 percent among those funds heavily allocated to emerging markets 
and private equity placements. GCC equity prices in dollar terms dropped by some 58 percent 
between September 15, 2008 and March 12, 2009 (a period during which virtually all bourses 
registered sharp declines). Over the same period, equity prices in UAE plummeted by 70 percent, 
contrasted with a decline of 55 percent for all emerging markets. (The World Bank 2009a, pp. 126–
127) 
 
On 16 November the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) index closed at 1981.44 points, falling by 68.51% 
from the year's peak of 6291.87 points on 15 January with a loss of 4.67 billion dirhams (US$1.27 
billion) in market value. On the same day, the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) also fell to its 
lowest point in 2008, with its general index hitting 2755.62, down 46.48% from 5148.49 points on 11 
June with a loss of 1.52 billion dirhams. 
 
The UAE Central Bank responded vigorously (and pre‐emptively) to mitigate the adverse economic 
developments, in particular the drying‐up of liquidity following the outflow of foreign deposits. On 
22 September 2008, the bank announced the establishment of an emergency lending facility of 50 
billion dirhams to provide much‐needed liquidity for the banking sector, and on 8 October it 
announced a 2‐percentage‐point cut in its lending rate to 3% – again to generate liquidity of local 
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banks. On 8 October the bank lowered the rate on its repurchase of certificate of deposit (REPO) 
from 2.0% to 1.5%. The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) and the ADIA also repatriated part of 
their foreign assets and deposited them in domestic banks to provide liquidity. In addition, SWFs' 
resources have been used to invest in local equity markets, and the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) 
and the KIA have purchased domestic bank shares to help enhance bank capitalization. Equally 
significant, to prevent spillovers from global turmoil and boost confidence in the economy, the 
central banks in a number of countries (the UAE, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) announced they would 
provide a three‐year blanket guarantee to deposits and savings in all national banks and foreign 
banks with ‘significant operations’ in the federation, including a guarantee to all interbank lending 
operations between banks. It also made a commitment to inject liquidity in the financial system if 
and when necessary. The government's decision to inject an additional 70 billion dirhams into the 
banking system in late October 2008 under an ‘emergency liquidity support fund’ (in the form of 
interest‐yielding government deposits) to provide banks with long‐term funding relief underscored 
the UAE's willingness to restore liquidity to the markets and rebuild confidence in the Emirates 
financial sector (IMF 2009f). 
 
However, the policy response, including the purchase in February 2009 by the UAE's Central Bank 
of US$10 billion of Dubai's bonds, provided some respite, but failed to stop the panic or the financial 
bleeding. This is because although the global financial turmoil in the Emirates' (and the GCC 
countries') banking sector has been uneven, all have seen a reduction in their profitability due to 
reduced growth in business volumes, tighter interest rate margins, increased credit costs, and direct 
and indirect exposure to the increasingly volatile local stock and property markets. For states like 
Dubai, which unlike oil‐rich Abu Dhabi relies on debt and equity finance raised on international 
markets to support its overly ambitious plans, access to credit has become a huge problem. The fact 
that the UAE Central Bank quietly purchased half of a US$20 billion five‐year bond issued by Dubai 
was seen as proof that Dubai was having trouble meeting its US$80 billion debt obligation. Not 
surprisingly, property prices which had fallen by about 25% in the last quarter of 2008 fell by the 
same amount in the first quarter of 2009. According to The Economist, in March 2009 the ‘UAE 
developers had postponed US$335 billion‐worth of construction projects. One two‐year project was 
proceeding so slowly that it would take 20 years to complete’. Similarly: 
 
the debt of Dubai's government and government‐controlled companies is about $80 billion. 
Almost $11 billion comes due this year (including interest) and $12.4 billion next. Nakheel 
alone must refinance a $3.52 billion bond in December and another worth 3.6 billion 
dirhams ($980 million) five months later. (The Economist 2009) 
 
According to the IMF, the decline in oil prices coupled with OPEC production cuts are projected to 
reduce oil export revenues by almost 50% in 2009 – or a loss of some US$300 billion compared with 
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2008. ‘As a result, oil exporters' current account surplus of around US$400 billion in 2008 is expected 
to turn into a deficit of US$30 billion in 2009’ (IMF 2009d). This will further compound the problems 
faced by some 1.5 million foreigners working in GCC countries. South Asians, in particular Indian 
nationals who make the largest expatriate community, mostly work as contract labourers – often on 
perilous construction sites earning as little as US$150 a month. The literal grounding to a halt of the 
once booming construction industry has hit these traumatized workers particularly hard because, 
among other restrictions, employees who lose work in the UAE and other states automatically have 
their visa rescinded, generally giving them about 30 days to leave the Emirate. This is unfortunate 
as the large expatriate community, even unemployed, can help support domestic demand to 
stimulate growth in the non‐oil GDP. 
 
Responding to the challenges 
 
Of course, given a crisis of this magnitude, a sustained economic recovery is only possible with the 
restoration of the global financial markets, in particular the unclogging of credit markets and growth 
in demand in the United States, the European Union and other advanced economies. The Arab 
World's challenge in the near term is to preserve the region's financial stability and cushion the 
impact of the global slowdown. This will not be easy if the global recession is prolonged, and for the 
region's stabilizers, the oil‐rich countries, the price of oil remains below US$50. This could result in 
further deterioration in the balance sheet of financial institutions, besides adversely impacting 
investor and consumer confidence. For the Arab countries, especially in the UAE, if the global 
economy does not pick‐up, there is the possibility of further asset price corrections. As noted above, 
the sharp downturn in asset prices since early 2008 has already translated into losses for the SWFs. 
If this trend continues, it would place even greater stress on the financial institutions of the Emirates. 
Given this, there is no better time than now to review the SWFs long‐term strategy for individual 
countries and the region. In particular, SWFs not only can play a greater role in supporting domestic 
macroeconomic and financial stability, but also can pursue profitable investment opportunities in 
the region. 
 
Furthermore, the Arab countries can both individually and collectively put in place policies to 
mitigate the adverse impact of the crisis as well as lay the foundations of future growth. There is no 
doubt that the Arab countries, especially the economically vulnerable economies, will require 
massive fiscal stimulus packages to stave off the immediate negative impacts of the crisis. Yet, these 
packages must be geared toward job creation and investment in infrastructure, including properly 
targeted safety net programmes to alleviate the suffering of those most adversely affected by the 
crisis. 14 Moreover, the stimulus packages must be well coordinated across countries so the 
outcomes can be reinforcing across the region. Both the oil‐rich Arab countries (which despite their 
own difficulties have greater fiscal space and are in a stronger position to help) as well as multilateral 
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financial institutions such as The World Bank and the IMF must help fund the stimulus packages 
for the region's poorer nations. In fact, for low‐income Arab countries, an increase in donor financing 
will be necessary to maintain aggregate demand and enhance social safety nets. 
 
Finally, one of the lessons of the Great Depression was that lack of cooperation and retreat into 
protectionism exacerbated the depression. Clearly, UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al‐
Nahayan understands this and has embraced multilateralism and a cooperative approach to solve 
economic and financial challenges. The UAE along with the six Gulf Arab countries that make‐up 
the GCC have been working together to stem the economic challenges. Yet, besides adopting 
expansionist policies discussed above, the other item on top of their agenda seems to be putting in 
place a long‐planned pact to issue a single currency before a self‐imposed 2010 deadline for 
monetary union. Of course, this raises the thorny question regarding the dollar peg. Specifically, 
even as the dollar has been depreciating against major currencies (and central banks around the 
world have been gradually moving away from the dollar in an effort to stem losses from the 
declining dollar exchange rate), the UAE and the GCC have for long stated that they would not de‐
peg their currency from the dollar as the dollar peg had served them well for decades. 15 The five 
GCC members (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain) peg their currencies to the dollar 
– thereby setting an official reference rate at which central banks buy and sell. The only exception is 
Kuwait, which in 2007 abandoned its peg and now links its currency to a currency basket that 
includes the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the pound sterling. The five GCC members have long 
maintained that the peg strengthens economic cooperation in the region, reduces the speculative 
pressure on regional currencies, prevents capital flight in UAE banks toward foreign‐denominated 
accounts, and that continuing the peg is an important requirement for issuing a common currency 
by 2010. 16 However, as the dollar has further plummeted, member states, most notably Dubai 
(including business interests in the region), have urged member states to rethink the peg and the 
region's broader monetary policy – namely, for the GCC to peg against a basket of currencies. They 
claim that such a policy would not only take into account the region's growing trade with the euro 
zone and Asia, but also curb the region's growing inflation problem. 17 Dubai and other states of 
the UAE (the UAE is one of the world's main holders of dollar‐denominated assets) are also 
concerned that the dollar's decline is hurting expatriates (both professionals and ordinary workers) 
from taking jobs in Dubai and other UAE states. 
 
In early 2008, the UAE Central Bank set up a task force to study a possible de‐pegging or revaluation 
of the dirham from the dollar. The study concluded that the dollar was a reliable peg for the Gulf 
currencies and that the GCC's planned common currency would remain linked to the dollar. 
Evidently, this strong endorsement helped reserve the large private capital inflows that were driven 
by expectations of an appreciation of the dirham vis‐à‐vis the dollar. Indeed, currency futures 
indicate that markets no longer doubt the peg. Moreover, in recent weeks (April–May 2009), the fact 
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that countries with pegged exchange rates (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and the UAE) have benefited from the continued monetary easing in the United States seems 
to have vindicated the central bank's decision. Nevertheless, what is certain is that in the near future 
the GCC will need a new monetary regime with a single currency set against a basket of currencies 
and interest rates that are appropriate to the domestic economy. In that sense, revaluation should 
be seen as the first step towards a GCC single currency. No doubt, even as the debate on the merits 
and demerits of the peg will continue (currently the only alternative given serious consideration is 
re‐pegging the dirham to a stronger basket of currencies), deeper intraregional trade among the 
Arab countries should be accelerated as it can act as a buffer against global downturns. Currently, 
the region is more integrated through labour mobility than through trade and investment. Although, 
regional integration from FDI and portfolio investments have risen in many Arab countries, the 
extent of intraregional trade still remains lower than in all other regions of the world, except for 
South Asia. Intraregional integration via freer movement of goods, services, labour and capital, 
including harmonization of regulatory and supervision standards, can help improve the 
competitiveness and resilience of the region. 
 
Postscript 
On 25 November 2009, the Dubai government was forced to ask its creditors for a six‐month 
payment standstill on an estimated $60 billion of liabilities owed by one of its own flagship 
conglomerates, Dubai World. 18 Coming at a time when many felt the worst of the crisis was over, 
this sent shock waves throughout the global financial and stock markets. The situation was further 
compounded when a senior government official (the Director General of Dubai's Department of 
Finance) stated that the Emirate did not believe it was under any obligation to stand behind the 
debts of Dubai World forever, and that creditors should take their share of the responsibility. 
Investors who had long been under the assumption of a blanket guarantee provided by the 
federation were clearly shocked and unnerved. Panicked investors fearing a possible bank‐run, and 
at worst, a sovereign default (as the Dubai government felt no responsibility to guarantee the debts 
of a state‐owned company), began to flee by retreating to the traditional safe haven: the US dollar. 
The panic only subsided after the Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates promised to ‘stand 
behind’ the region's banks by providing more emergency liquidity. Although fears have receded for 
now, the inability and unwillingness of the Dubai government to refinance the debt of its own 
company (Dubai World), has been a rude awakening for investors around the world. Investors can 
no longer take for granted the explicit backing governments have traditionally given to state‐owned 
companies against insolvency. The reality is that governments around the world have responded to 
the financial crisis by taking on unsustainable levels of debt and many are simply no longer in a 
position to provide more finance – Dubai is a case in point. Finally, the manner in which the 
government of Dubai handled (or mishandled) this issue has done damage to its credibility and put 
a significant stain on its once stellar reputation as the premier place to do business in the Arab world. 
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1. The Arab World, broadly termed the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by The World Bank 
includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, and Yemen. 
2. GCC countries include the UAE, Oman, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. 
3. While there is no agreed upon definition of an SWF, the US Department of Treasury defines SWFs 
as government investment vehicles funded by foreign exchange assets that are managed separately 
from official reserves. More broadly, SWFs are investment funds controlled by governments. They 
are state‐owned investment funds composed of financial assets such as stocks, bonds, real estate, or 
other financial instruments funded by foreign exchange assets. SWFs can be structured as a fund or 
as a reserve investment corporation. The types of acceptable investments included in each SWF vary 
from country to country. For example, countries with liquidity concerns limit investments to only 
very liquid public debt instruments. A number of countries have created SWFs to diversify their 
revenue streams. For example, funding for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund comes from 
oil revenues; the government of Singapore Investment Corporation is funded through foreign 
exchange reserves; while the UAE relies on its oil exports for its wealth. As a result, the UAE devotes 
a portion of its reserves in an SWF that invests in assets that can act as a shield against oil‐related 
risk. The amount of money in SWFs is substantial. The estimated value of all SWFs is estimated to 
be US$3.6 trillion – and if current trends hold, they are projected to reach US$10 trillion by 2012 
(International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2008a). 
4. The UAE is a federation of seven states situated in the south‐east of the Arabian Peninsula. They 
include: Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al‐Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al‐Quwain. 
5. Of course, the trade and financial channels of crisis transmission often interact because the 
availability of trade credit is linked to trade volume. 
6. The ‘trade openness index’ is the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. 
7. Remittances totalled US$6.3 billion in 2007 – up 25% over 2006 levels (The World Bank 2009b, p. 
15). 
8. Over the past decade, the UAE has pursued ambitious free‐market policies to diversify its 
economy away from a dependence on fossil fuel. In 2004, the United States and the UAE entered 
into a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) which established a formal dialogue to 
promote increased trade and investment between the two countries. 
9. By the end of 2008, only a few Gulf banks had exposure to subprime loans. Abu Dhabi Commercial 
Bank with US$272 million, Bahrain's Arab Banking Corporation with US$1.2 billion, and Kuwait‐
based Gulf Investment Corporation with US$446 million, and Bahrain's Gulf International Bank was 
downgraded by Moody's because of the bank's holdings of US mortgage‐backed securities. It had 
to make provisions for US$966 million and raise additional capital (Woertz 2008, p. 8). 
10. Abu Dhabi accounts for 94% of the UAE's crude oil output. Not surprisingly, is the wealthiest of 
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the seven members of the Emirates with more than half of its GDP. 
11. In fact, Dubai came to rival Bahrain, the major financial centre in the region for more than four 
decades. 
12. According to the Cummins (2008), the average asking price for homes in Dubai fell by 4% in 
October 2008 from September 2008, while prices for the upscale Dubai ‘villas’ fell by 19%. In the 
next‐door emirate Abu Dhabi, average home prices fell by 5%. 
13. On 11 May 2009, Nakheel confirmed it was receiving funds from the Dubai government to meet 
its outstanding obligations. In 2009, Dubai sold US$10 billion of bonds to the UAE Central Bank to 
raise funds to support cash‐strapped state‐linked companies and plans to issue another US$10 
billion in bonds later this year. 
14. In fact, job creation is very critical as unemployment in the region is high with 14% of the labour 
force on average being unemployed, compared with a world average of 6.7%. Unemployment is 
particularly acute among youths and women. 
15. The dirham was adopted as the official currency of the UAE in 1973 when it was pegged to the 
US dollar at a rate of 3.9474. In 1978, the dirham was de‐pegged. The dirham's exchange rate against 
the US dollar was raised to 3.671, and in 1998 the exchange rate was adjusted to 3.672. 
16. Only Oman has ruled out revaluing its currency, arguing that a weaker rial helps attract foreign 
investment and make exports more competitive – and in the process it offsets inflation. It has also 
ruled out joining the plan to create a single currency. Oman also dropped out of proposed monetary 
union in 2006. 
17. An undervalued dirham imports inflation into the UAE because exports are priced in US dollars 
and the bulk of imports in other currencies. 
18. It is estimated that the total debt Dubai owes is about $80 billion – with Dubai World shouldering 
the bulk. Dubai World, an investment company, is owned by the government of Dubai. It is one of 
the three main state‐owned enterprises in Dubai, besides the Investment Corporation of Dubai and 
Dubai Holdings (which ‘owns’ the Jumeirah Hotel Group, including the seven star Burj Al Arab). 
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